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Summary
The purpose of this research is to find an ethical-theoretical framework
which satisfies the following conditions:
.1. the starting point of this framework is shared morality, which plays a
significant role;
2. it can be used to assess the termination of l i fe of newborns (bv terminati-
on of l i fc I mean kil l ing and letting die).
All the authors who have taken the terrnination o1 lif'e as the subject of their
research take a pluralism of moral belieli as their starting point, liorn therc
they look it in various ways for solutions. In their argLlmcnts and in their
proposals for solutions they account - to a greater or lcsser extent - fbr this
pluralism of moral beliels. Although these authors do r.rot dcny shared
morality - in their arguments and solutions remnants of shared morality can
be found -, shared morality is not done full justice in their writ ings. In other
words, this morality is not given independent signil icance.
This research aims to find an ethical theory that cktes nol dcny pluralisrrr
of moral beliefs, but that assigns shared morality a place and a significance
of its own. Once fbund, that theory wil l be applied to thc assessment o[' the
termination of life of newborns.
The termination of lif'e of newborns is the medical-cthical problern central
to this research. ln addition. in a wider context thc cthical-theoretical f iame-
work is also applied to the termination of lif'e of chilclren, the n.rcntally han-
dicapped, patients who are in a persistent vegetativc state and lo late tcrntina-
tion of pregnancy.
In chapter 2 the first step in the research is madc, i.c. rnaking explicit what
shared morality constitutes with referencc to the termination of l i f 'e of ncw-
borns. 'Shared morality' is taken to lnean: morality that is not subjcct to
discussion. It consists of norms and values that are not qucstioned in public
d iscussions.
One should look fbr the shared morality in ancl around the discussron
about the termination ol l i l 'e of newbolns, for in thc arguinenls ancl solutiorrs
of participants to the debate rernnants of shared morality can be lbuncl. A
problem in this search is the fact that the discussion is opaquc. bccause it is
polcmical. It is thcrelbrc necessary to neutralise any tcndentioLlsltess. T'o that
purpose four strategics are revealed, f iom which it nppears that lvc arc
agreed on at least a number of issues. ' l-hus r.l,e agrcc on thc fncf that thcrc is
a l imit beyond which there should be no (rnore) treattncnt. Yct u,e also asrcc
that there is a l imit beyond which there shor-rld bc treatment. And aithough
rnany advocate that parents have a say, no onc woulcl welcorne a situatirrn irr
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which parents put themselves above their child. We all think that parents
should want the best for their children. No one wishes a slippery slope; no
one considers it desirable to accept involuntary euthanasia in the near future.
We fear the idea of a child that is 'custom-made'.
In chapter 3 the search begins for an ethical-theoretical framework within
which shared morality is given a place and a meaning of its own and with
which the termination of life of newboms can be evaluated. It is explored
whether Ten Have - an ethicist who puts pluralism of moral beliefs into
perspective - offers such a framework.
Ten Have is part of a group of ethicists who resist applied ethics. A
report is given of the discussion that developed between the adherents of
applied ethics and Ten Have's group. From the report it appears that it is
unfortunate that the aforementioned ethicists consider it necessary to discuss
which sort of ethics deserves preference, for several ways of practicing ethics
can very well coexist.
The report also makes clear that Ten Have does not offer the right frame-
work. He explicitly does not intend to solve problems, so his framework
clearly does not comply with the second condition.
The fourth chapter contains a summary of the theory of Kekes, as discussed
in Moral Tradition and Individuality (1989), Facing Evil (1990), and The
Moraliry of Pluralism (1993). In his theory Kekes attributes an important
place to shared morality; moreover, he shows how conflicts can be approa-
ched and solved. As for the former, Kekes poses that shared values form an
important part of a moral tradition. The necessity of maintaining a balance
between moral tradition and individuality is - thus Kekes asserts - the
essence of good lives. Individuals aspire to live good lives; the moral
tradition they are a part of guides them in that desire. A moral tradition
offers various models for such good lives, but also limits the ways that are
permissible to achieve those lives. However, a moral tradition is not an
uncomfortable suit we may put on for the sake of propriety but a repository
of ideals of good lives, ideals that have stood the test of time. Moreover, a
moral tradition supplies us with a shared identity.
As for the solution to the conflict: solving a problem is more than deci-
ding what to do in a given situation, according to Kekes. One also needs to
consider the consequences of the various solutions, the consequences for the
entire system of values of which the problem is a part. The problems we
encounter occur within certain traditions. This system of values in the back-
ground is important to all of us and it is vital that this system remains.
Because we are all connected through values that are more important than
the issue dividing us, problems are less insurmountable than they seem.
When searching for solutions we are guided by an articulation of our shared
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values and by our assessment of the effect the various solutions have on
those values.
Before Kekes' theory can be applied to the termination of lif'e of newborns,
it must be examined whether it can withstand criticism. Therefore chapter 5
is dedicated to criticism. An important objection against Kekes' theory could
come from the realm of rational-universalistic ethics. Kekes believes in
conventions, in the existence and retaining of shared morality present in c
society (without, however, excluding the possibil i ty and desirabil ity of
(certain) changes). Yet the adherents of rational-universalistic ethics oppose
existing (shared) morality - certainly when euthanasia of newborns is concer-
ned. Their criticism of Kekes is rejected, using as the most important
counterargument he assertion that these ethicists cannot themselves avoid
particularity (neither on a theoretical level, nor on the level of a concrete
problem).
In the sixth chapter the important shared values concerning the termination
of life of newborns are articulated. In the termination of lif'e of newborns two
conventions are the most important: the convention of 'living' and the
convention of 'avoiding (the infliction of) pain'.
The problem of the termination of life of newborns can be subdivided
into two parts: one concerns a conflict between 'living' and 'avoiding (the
infliction of) pain'. Sometimes a baby needs to suffer or one needs to inflict
pain to keep it alive. In such cases a conflict between incommensurable and
incompatible values arises: living (with pain) cannot be compared to not
living (without pain); moreover, in cases of possible termination of life thc
choice between living (with pain) is incompatible with not l iving (without
pain). To realise both values simultaneously - l iving without pain - is
impossible in situations in which the termination of lif'e might be considered.
The other part of the problem concerns the boundaries of the convention
'l iving'. Some babies - anencephalics - are allowed to die, but not because
they would suffer so much if they stayed alive. These anencephalic babies
cannot suffer. The conflict between 'living' and 'avoiding (the infliction of)
pain' does not apply to them. The babies are allowed to die because they fall
outside the scope of the convention ' l iving', simply because there is no
obligation to protect their lives, or so it seems.
The element of confl ict is discussed and assessed in chapters 7, U and 9; the
element of scope in chapters l0 and I l.
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In chapter 7 it is argued that the contlict between ' l iving' and 'avoiding (the
infliction ot) pain' did not begin to exist - as some say - with the medical-
technical abilities and knowledge developing. On the contrary. the conflict
has been in existence since at least the early twentieth century.
Chapter 8 gives a discussion of the various solutions presented for this
cont'lict. First the solutions are discussed of the reformer Singer, the so-called
pro-lifers (those who wish to use a medical criterion and who reject conside-
rations concerning the 'quality of life' and involvernent of the parents'
wishes) and the moderates (those rvho do not reject involving the parents and
who wish to use the principles of 'quality of l i t-e' or best interest as criteria).
The solutions are assessed against the background of the entire system of
values. The solution of a number of moderates - those who use the principle
of best interest - is favoured the most. With this in n-rind the conflict-part of
the termination of life of newborns is then assessed in chapter 9. The most
important conclusions are that:
1. medical experts have to put the principle of best interest into operation;
2. parents should only l.rave a say in the termination of life of newborns
insofar as they make their own interests subservient o the conventions
and to the interests of their childt
J. the latter should only apply to those rare cascs in which ' l ivipo' :rnrl
'avoiding (the infl iction ot) pain' are of equal weight.
It is also argued that the difference between killing someone and allowin-e
sonleone to die is morally relevant, that we have to be extremely careful with
relation to killing and that thc principle of the double eft'ect - pain relief with
the lbreseen but unintended (side) effect of acceleratins death - is a usable
principle.
In the last part of the ninth chapter Kekes' theory is applied to three other
problem areas. lt appears this theory can without question be used for tl-re
assessment of the termination ol l i fe of children and the mentally handicap-
ped (to the latter groups the same applies. tnutatis mtrtandis, as to the group
of newborns). For the problen.r of late termination of pregnancy it is conclu-
ded: on the assumption that unborn children do not suff-er due to their
affl ictions, the contlict between'l iving' and'avoiding (the infl iction ot) pain'
does not apply here and therctbre a late terminaticln of pregnancy is Lrnjustifi-
able.
In chapters l0  and 11 the scope of  the convent ion ' l iv i r tg '  is  d iscussed in
connection with anencephalic habies, bLrt especially alstl in connection with
patients in a persistent ve-qetative stale (and severcly trtentally handicapped
people). It appears that not irL-cting anencephalic babies can ahval's bc
justit ied. E,ither we are certain that these babies wil l nevel' havc ttre potential
fbr consciousness, irt which case they fall outsidc the orcler-part of the
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convention ' l iving' and we are not obligcd to protcct their l ivcs; or wc are
not certain about their potential for consciousness. ln that case. however, the
con f l i c t  be tween ' l i v i ng 'and 'avo i c l i ng  l t he  i n l ' l i c l i on  o f )  pa in ' i s  app l i cab le
and the latter shor.rlcl override.
With relation to patients in a persistent vegetative state thc argument is
that if we know fbr certain that thc potential for conscioustress i  permanent-
ly absent, they, just as anencephalic babics, f-all or.rtsidc the scope ol' the
order-part of the convention ' l iving'. Wc nrav allow thenr to dit-. if necessary
even by discontinuing the artif icial nutrit ion and hyclratiorr.
If we are uncertain about the absl:nce of the potcntial l i lr consciousness in
a patient, then the order-part of ' l iving' and also of 'avoiding (the infl iction
of) pain' is applicable. Since such patients usually do not need [o undergo
painful treatment, the convention 'avoiding (thc inil iction oiJ pain' does not
need to, or hardly needs to be violated - in order to kccp thern alive - and
therel'orc the convention ' l iving' shoulcl override. This nrcans that u'e have
atr obligation to keep these patients alive continually. Flolt Kekes' point o1'
vierv this solution is - assuming thele is uncertainty with regards to thc
abil ity of consciousness - inevitablc. But many say this solution is undesira-
ble. The only way out of this impasse is not :r continLration ol the moral
discussion, but an attempt at greater certainty concerning the laets, i.r ' .
concerning the possib le absence of  the potcnt ia l  for .corrsc iousness in  Pl t t i t - t t l r
in a persistent vegetative state (the sanre applies to scvercly nientally handi-
capped people, mutatis mutandis).
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